Games and Information

By Prof. Ankur A. Kulkarni | IIT Bombay

Learners enrolled: 4450 | Exam registration: 188

ABOUT THE COURSE:
This is an advanced course in game theory, with a particular emphasis on the role of information. We begin with static games and cover the basic notations there. About 65% of the course concerns dynamic games where we introduce information structures, role of information structure on equilibria, Bayesian games and information asymmetry. We then cover the basic concepts of mechanism design. We do a quick overview of signaling and screening, and introduce information design. As a final topic we do a study of pre-play communication – achievable payoffs and correlated equilibria. We finally end with a few applications of game theory in finance.

INTENDED AUDIENCE: Graduate students in engineering and economics.

INDUSTRY SUPPORT: Stock and commodity exchanges, platforms like Ola, Uber, Amazon.

Summary

Course Status :	Completed
Course Type :	Elective
Language for course content :	English
Duration :	12 weeks
Category :	Computer Science and Engineering Data Science Artificial Intelligence
Credit Points :	3
Level :	Postgraduate
Start Date :	22 Jan 2024
End Date :	12 Apr 2024
Enrollment Ends :	05 Feb 2024
Exam Registration Ends :	16 Feb 2024
Exam Date :	21 Apr 2024 IST

Note: This exam date is subject to change based on seat availability. You can check final exam date on your hall ticket.

Page Visits

Course layout

Week 1: Outline of the course, Definition of a game, Nash equilibrium, Examples of Nash equilibrium, Weakly dominated strategies.

Week 2: Strictly dominated strategies, Aumann model of incomplete information, Knowledge operator, Common knowledge, Structure theorem of common knowledge.

Week 3: Dynamic games, Information structures, Commitment, Mixed and Behavioral strategies, Kuhn’s theorem, Bayesian games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Mechanism design(ContdProof of the structure theorem of common knowledge, Aumann model of incomplete information with belief, Aumann’s agreement theorem, Zero-sum game definition, Security strategies, Saddle point strategies.

Week 4: Further properties of saddle point strategies, Mixed strategies, Existence of mixed saddle point strategies, Von-Nuenmann minmax theorem.

Week 5: Computation of mixed saddle point strategies for various matrix games, Existence of nash equilibrium for non zero-sum game via Kakutani fixed point theorem

Week 6: Existence of Nash equilibrium for infinite strategy space via Brower’s fixed point theorem, Quantal response: definition and examples, Dynamic game definition, solution concept, Standard normal form of a dynamic game, Threat equilibrium.

Week 7: Extensive Form Game, Single Acts Games, Informationally Inferior Games

Week 8: Information Structure in Single Act Games, Nested and Ladder Nested Extensive, Equilibrium Algorithm Lecture, Stagewise Multi-Act Game, Feedback Nash Equilibrium, Stagewise Multi-Act Game, Feedback Nash Equilibrium

Week 9: Mixed & Behavioral Strategies, Conditions for Equivalence of Mixed & Behavioral Strategies, Kuhn's Theorem, Equivalence of Mixed and Behavioral Strategies

Week 10: Games of Incomplete Information, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Self-enforcement of Nash Equilibrium, Stackelberg game

Week 11: Principal-Agent Models, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, Games with Contracts

Week 12: Correlated Equilibrium, Bayesian Game with Mediated Communication, Revelation Principle, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Books and references

R. Myerson, “Game theory: Analysis of Conflict”, Harvard University Press, 2013;
T. Basar and G. Olsder, “Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory”, SIAM, 1999;
D Fudenberg and J. Tirole, “Game Theory”, Cambridge University Press, 1991
M. Maschler, E. Solan and S. Zamir, “Game Theory”, Cambridge University Press, 2020
E. Rasmusen. Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Wiley-Blackwell, 2006

Instructor bio

Prof. Ankur A. Kulkarni

IIT Bombay

Prof.Ankur A. Kulkarni is an Associate Professor and the Kelkar Family Chair in Quantitative Finance at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay (IITB). He is a systems theorist with an interest in decision making in distributed, decentralised and strategic environments, with informational complexities, which he investigates using the lens of game theory, information theory, control theory, machine learning, and mathematical optimization. His current focus is on strategic inference, stealth, privacy, information elicitation and nudging. He has published 30 papers in international journals and more than 30 papers in international conferences. He has been a consultant to the Securities and Exchange Board of India wherein he was solely responsible for suggesting regulatory interventions for high frequency algorithmic trading. He presently serves on the IT-Project Advisory Board of SEBI and is responsible for advising SEBI on utilizing advanced technologies such as AI/ML and data analytics and guiding data-related policies for internal use and public use. He is also an advisor to the Tata Consultancy Services and on the technical advisory committee of Maha-IT, a Govt of Maharashtra enterprise. He was previously a consultant to HDFC Life Insurance Company wherein he tackled the problem of design of incentives for sales agents; to Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited on anti-money laundering and anomaly detection, and to Bank of Baroda on smart cash management. He received his B.Tech. from IITB in 2006, followed by M.S. in 2008 and Ph.D. in 2010, both from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). He was an Associate (from 2015--2018) of the Indian Academy of Sciences, Bangalore (a honour reserved for only 100 scientists under the age of 35 across all fields), he has been an editor for several conferences, a recipient of the INSPIRE Faculty Award of the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, 2013, and of several Best Paper awards and the Excellence in Teaching Award at IIT Bombay. He has been a visitor to MIT in the USA, University of Cambridge in UK, NUS in Singapore, University of Paris, IISc in Bangalore and KTH in Sweden.

Course certificate

The course is free to enroll and learn from. But if you want a certificate, you have to register and write the proctored exam conducted by us in person at any of the designated exam centres.

The exam is optional for a fee of Rs 1000/- (Rupees one thousand only).

Date and Time of Exams: 21 April 2024 Morning session 9am to 12 noon; Afternoon Session 2pm to 5pm.

Registration url: Announcements will be made when the registration form is open for registrations.

The online registration form has to be filled and the certification exam fee needs to be paid. More details will be made available when the exam registration form is published. If there are any changes, it will be mentioned then.

Please check the form for more details on the cities where the exams will be held, the conditions you agree to when you fill the form etc.

CRITERIA TO GET A CERTIFICATE

Average assignment score = 25% of average of best 8 assignments out of the total 12 assignments given in the course.
Exam score = 75% of the proctored certification exam score out of 100

Final score = Average assignment score + Exam score

YOU WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR A CERTIFICATE ONLY IF AVERAGE ASSIGNMENT SCORE >=10/25 AND EXAM SCORE >= 30/75. If one of the 2 criteria is not met, you will not get the certificate even if the Final score >= 40/100.

Certificate will have your name, photograph and the score in the final exam with the breakup.It will have the logos of NPTEL and IIT Bombay .It will be e-verifiable at nptel.ac.in/noc.

Only the e-certificate will be made available. Hard copies will not be dispatched.

Once again, thanks for your interest in our online courses and certification. Happy learning.

- NPTEL team

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